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This paper gives an international comparison of the redistributive effect of personal 
income taxes in the 15 countries of the EU, using the European tax-benefit model 
EUROMOD. We focus on the effect of personal income taxes, social insurance 
contributions and other direct taxes. We present the contribution of progressivity and 
average tax rate to the reduction of income inequality, as well as the weight of the 
various types of tax concessions (i.e. exemptions, deductions, allowances and credits). 
There appears to be a wide variety among countries in the level of inequality 
reduction as well as in the instruments used to achieve this reduction. Personal income 
taxes are in all countries the most important source for inequality reduction, which is 
to a large extent, though not solely, due to the progressive rate schedule. Countries 
with a high degree of pre-tax inequality do not systematically redistribute more 
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The relative welfare position of households will be modified by income taxes if these 
are not proportional. This impact of taxes on the income and welfare distribution is 
called the redistributive effect of taxes. The redistributive effect of taxes depends on 
the one hand on the departure from proportionality, i.e. the degree of progressivity, 
and on the other on the tax level, measured by the average tax rate. In this paper we 
use the microsimulation model EUROMOD to compare the redistributive effect of 
social security contributions and income taxes in the countries of the EU-15 (i.e. those 
countries that formed the European Union before 1
st May 2004). How do these taxes 
relate to one another with respect to inequality reduction, progressivity and tax level? 
Is there a relationship between pre-tax income inequality and the extent of 
redistribution through taxes? How do the various measures of the tax system (e.g. the 
rate structure, tax allowances, deductions and credits) contribute to progressivity, and 
consequently to the redistributive effect? 
 
Our analysis is confined to personal income taxes, social security contributions and 
other direct taxes on income. This means that an important part of the distributional 
process is not included, namely social benefits and transfers in kind. For an analysis 
of the joint effect of taxes and social benefits using EUROMOD, we refer to 
Immervoll et al. (2004). Another limitation of our analysis is that we have not taken 
account of potential changes in household behaviour (e.g. labour supply responses) 
and in macro-economic aggregates (e.g. inflation, economic growth), which affect the 
pre-tax income distribution. As our analysis is static, we do not adopt a life-cycle 
perspective. Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at the redistributive impact of taxes 
on income inequality at a given point in time, as these taxes affect disposable income 
of households, and thus their income security. 
 
International comparisons of the redistributive effect of taxes are up until now 
relatively rare; we present an overview of the literature in section 2. Next, we discuss 
the microsimulation model EUROMOD, together with an overview of the content and 
characteristics of the various tax instruments that are used in each country. In section 
3 we present the measures we use for analysing the redistributive effect and 
progressivity of taxes. Special attention will be given to the decomposition measures 
for progressivity over the different tax instruments. Next, we apply these measures for 
each EU-country using EUROMOD. We first look at the total of taxes, and then in 




2  Background: what do we know from previous research? 
 
There are few studies that present an international comparison of the redistributive 
effect of taxes. Wagstaff et al. (1999a)
2 have compared twelve OECD countries; the 
                                                 
2 Berglas (1971) presents results for UK, France, US, West-Germany and Japan; Kakwani (1977a) 
compares Australia, Canada, UK and US, based on official data; Zandvakili (1994) compares 8 LIS-
countries by using the measures from the generalised entropy family; Atkinson et al. (1995) for a 
  1results for Belgium are calculated in Verbist (2002). The results are derived from 
either survey or administrative data on a representative sample of the population. The 
data sources used are not all from the same year (see table 1). Also the sampling unit, 
and as a consequence the unit of analysis, is not identical for all surveys: for most 
countries the unit of analysis is the household or the family, for Switzerland it is the 
tax unit. Another difference lies in the way tax data are obtained: for most countries 
actual tax payments are provided through the questionnaire or from the tax authority’s 
tax files, for some countries tax data are estimated with a microsimulation model (i.c. 
for Belgium, Italy, Germany and the US). The income concept used is gross income 
defined along the lines of the LIS (cf. Smeeding et al., 1985). The income taxes 
included are all personal income taxes, irrespective of the level of government at 
which they are levied and are calculated net of any tax credits. Social insurance 
contributions are excluded, as are any taxes on capital gains and on imputed income 
from owner occupancy. In our calculations with EUROMOD we will use a wider 
scope of taxes and include social insurance contributions and other direct taxes. Both 
income and income tax payments are equivalised using a parametric equivalence scale 
ei 
3  in each country. The main results for thirteen countries are presented in table 1 
and figure 1. 
 
Table 1:  Decomposition of redistributive effect over vertical, horizontal and reranking 
contributions for 13 OECD countries, equivalent incomes. 
Country (year)  GX GN RE  RE as % of GX t  K
T Π  
Belgium (1992)  0.2980  0.2335  0.0645  21.6  0.2040  0.2465 
Denmark (1987)  0.3023  0.2703  0.0320  10.6  0.2966  0.0938 
Finland (1990)  0.2685  0.2253  0.0432  16.1  0.2188  0.1644 
France (1989)  0.3219  0.3065  0.0154  4.8  0.0620  0.2717 
Germany (1988)  0.2591  0.2312  0.0279  10.8  0.1108  0.2433 
Ireland (1987)  0.3870  0.3418  0.0452  11.7  0.1540  0.2685 
Italy (1991)  0.3248  0.3009  0.0239  7.4  0.1354  0.1554 
Netherlands (1992)  0.2846  0.2517  0.0329  11.6  0.1487  0.1977 
Spain (1990)  0.4083  0.3694  0.0389  9.5  0.1397  0.2545 
Sweden (1990)  0.3004  0.2608  0.0396  13.2  0.3270  0.0891 
Switzerland (1992)  0.2716  0.2541  0.0174  6.4  0.1210  0.1528 
UK (1993)  0.4121  0.3768  0.0352  8.5  0.1421  0.2278 
US (1987)  0.4049  0.3673  0.0376  9.3  0.1370  0.2371 
Notes: RE is the difference between pre-tax (GX)  and post-tax Gini (GN), t is the average tax rate, ΠT
K 
is the Kakwani index of progressivity computed on the assumption that all households face the same 
tax schedule (see Wagstaff et al. 1999a). 
Sources: for Belgium Verbist (2002); for other countries Wagstaff et al. (1999a) 
 
We can see a large variation in redistributive effect and in the mix of t and   across 
countries. Apparently there is no positive link between pre-tax inequality and the 
extent of redistribution: it is not the case that countries with high pre-tax inequality 
systematically redistribute more (in order to compensate more for this higher pre-tax 
inequality, or less as they may not be interested in more inequality). The Pearson’s 
rank correlation between G
K
T0 Π
X and RE is 0.1647 and not significantly different from 
                                                                                                                                            
number of LIS-countries; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer provide the more recent results, focussing on the 
financing of health care (2001, Wagstaff et al. 1999a & 1999b, van Doorslaer et al. 1999). 
3 A parametric equivalence scale is a set of scales with a common functional form and for which 
parametric variations change the scale rate relativities for households of different types. The 
equivalence scale ei for a household i, is here specified as ei = (nA + ηnK)
θ, with nA= number of adults; 
nK = number of children; parameters  η and θ, with η=θ=0.5. 
  2zero. Figure 1, however, suggests a kind of trade-off between progressivity and tax 
level. The correlation coefficient between t and Π0
K is –0.75, which points in this 
direction (significant at the 0.005 level). It can be argued that a government chooses a 
low tax level with a high degree of progressivity: when the overall tax burden is mild, 
then it is not so difficult to put more of this burden on the broadest shoulders. France 
and Germany appear to have chosen this path. According to Loizides (1988)
4 Greece 
has also opted for a high degree of progressivity (Kakwani of 0.3558) with a low 
average tax level (t=0.078). But when the tax level is high, then it seems difficult to 
avoid that everybody pays his share, such that the average tax rate increases less with 
income level. The Scandinavian countries and especially Denmark and Sweden 
combine the highest level of taxes with the lowest degree of progressivity. Most other 
countries take up a position somewhere in between. 
 
 
Figure  1:  Regression of average tax rate (T) and progressivity (PK) of 13 OECD 
countries (based on data in table 1) 
 
 
Similar results are found on the basis of the OECD data published in 1990, based on 
administrative tax records (see OECD (1990) for the data, and Verbist (2002) for the 
calculations). An international comparison of the degree of progressivity and its 
building stones is provided by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) who have used 
these OECD-data to calculate the progressivity of PIT in 17 OECD-countries. 
Countries exhibit a wide variety in the use they make of the different instruments 
determining progressivity. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer distinguish four groups of 
countries: 
                                                 
4 The figures of Loizides are not entirely comparable with those in table 2. He uses data from tax 
statistics, thus having only taxable income from tax units; income data are not corrected for family size; 
his figures refer to 1978. 
  31)  rate structure countries, where progressivity follows mainly from the pure rate 
effect. This group includes Australia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Spain; 
2)  allowance countries, where progressivity is mainly attributable to the existence of 
allowances, i.e. Ireland, the UK and the US; 
3)  credit countries, for which tax credits are the dominant source of progressivity. 
Only Denmark belongs to this group; 
4)  mixed structure countries, who use a mixture of the different instruments. These 
countries are Belgium, Canada, Finland, Sweden and Germany. 
 
In the following sections we will calculate the redistributive effect of total taxes using 
EUROMOD. EUROMOD has the advantage that it is designed especially for this kind 
of international comparative research. Moreover, it works with databases of a more 
recent period than the other studies. It will also give us the opportunity to test if the 
trade-off hypothesis between progressivity and tax burden holds. 
 
 
3  EUROMOD and the transition from gross to net income 
 
EUROMOD is a tax-benefit model for the 15 countries of the European Union (for 
more information, see Immervoll et al., 1999; Sutherland 2001). EUROMOD is a 
static empirical microsimulation model. ‘Static’ means that the model simulates the 
tax-benefit system at one particular moment in time; it is not build to simulate life- 
cycle incomes for individuals, nor does it, by default, include behavioural reactions to 
simulated policy changes. The model covers a major part of the different national 
personal income tax and social benefits systems. It calculates taxes and benefits for a 
representative set of micro-data. These national datasets are collected at various points 
in time between 1993 and 1998, but have all been adjusted to 1998 prices and 
incomes (for an overview of the various data sources, see appendix 1). Policy 
measures in the model used here also refer to 1998. 
 
Gross income components are taken directly from the dataset or, where necessary, are 
imputed from net income (see Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2001). Gross income 
includes all gross cash benefit payments, gross income from work (salaries, wages, 
self-employment income), property income, other cash market income and 
occupational pension income (see also appendix 3). To arrive at disposable or net 
income (N) we subtract personal income taxes (TPIT), other taxes (TOTH) and social 
insurance contributions (TSIC) from gross income (X): 
  N = X - TPIT - TOTH - TSIC
 
As we have already mentioned we only look at part of the redistribution process. Cash 
benefits are not included here in the calculations, as we focus on the tax system. They 
are however simulated in EUROMOD (for an analysis of the redistributive effect of 
taxes and cash benefits together using EUROMOD, see Immervoll et al., 2004). 
Collective goods and services, such as education, are not taken into account, though 
they also have an important redistributive impact. Moreover, not all taxes could be 
included; we had to limit ourselves to those that are modelled in EUROMOD, i.e. 
direct taxes at the individual or the household level. So we do not look at taxes on 
  4goods and services, nor at corporate income taxes or employer social contributions. 
We study the following three types of taxes (T = total taxes): 
-  personal income taxes Tpit (at the national level); 
-  social insurance contributions Tsic (excluding employer contributions); 
-  other income taxes Toth (for most countries this is a small category). 
The content of these three types will be discussed in more detail in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
3.1  Social insurance contributions (except employer contributions) 
In all countries mandatory social insurance contributions (SIC) are levied on labour 
income from employees and self-employed as well as on some social benefits (Table 
2).  In Germany the self-employed pay only voluntary contributions. In four countries 
SIC on labour income are the only contributions that are levied (Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and UK). 
 
In all other countries recipients of either pensions or unemployment allowances or 
sickness and disability benefits also pay contributions, though in most cases the rate is 
lower than on income from work (for more on this see Verbist, 2004). In Denmark 
and Luxembourg, social assistance recipients pay contributions as well. France is the 
only country that levies social contributions on family benefits and capital income. 
 
Table 2: Basis for levying social insurance contributions in the EU-15, EUROMOD, 1998 







Austria x  x  x    
Belgium x  x  x    x  (²) 
Denmark x  x    x  x  (²)(³) 
Finland x  x  x x   
France x  x x  x x  (
4) 
Germany x  (
1) x    
Greece x  x x    
Ireland x  x      
Italy x  x      
Luxembourg x  x  x  x  x  (³) 
Netherlands x  x  x  x  x  (²) 
Portugal x  x       
Spain x x   x   
Sweden x  x    x   
UK x  x       
(
1) Only voluntary contributions; (²) on sickness & disability benefits;  
(³) On social assistance; (
4) on family benefits, capital income 
 
3.2  Components of the Personal Income Tax Systems in the EU 
The personal income tax (PIT) schedule is a complex of different instruments, such as 
the rate structure and various tax advantages. Final tax liability is determined by 
different factors: pre-tax income (X), tax exempt (categories of) income (E), tax 
deductions (D(X)) and tax allowances (A) that can be applied on pre-tax income, the 
rate schedule (r(Y)) and tax credits (K). Pre-tax income X includes all income 
components before tax, and thus determines to a great extent tax liabilities. Taxable 
income Y must be distinguished from pre-tax income. Some income components are 
part of pre-tax income, but do not have to be declared to the tax authorities, and thus 
  5are not included in the concept of taxable income; we call this tax exemptions E (e.g. 
child benefits in most countries). A further distinction between pre-tax and taxable 
income arises from the existence of tax allowances and deductions. Tax allowances A 
are here defined as a fixed amount subtracted from pre-tax income. They can be 
thought of as zero-rate tax bands. Tax deductions D(X) also reduce taxable income. 
Contrary to tax allowances, they are not a fixed amount but their level is a function of 
pre-tax income. So taxable income Y = X – E – D(X) - A. The rate schedule r(.) is then 
applied to taxable income, thus leading us to gross tax liability Tg = r(Y). Finally, we 
find net (or final) tax liability Tpit by reducing gross tax liability Tg with total tax 
credits K, which may itself be a function of X: Tpit = Tg – K(X).  
 
We present here an overview of the different tax components of personal income tax 
systems in the EU-15 (Table 3). In practice, it can be sometimes arbitrary to label an 
income component as either an exemption, a deduction or an allowance. This 
distinction is however not too important. What is relevant is to see how taxable 
income Y is arrived at.  
 
It is useful to distinguish market income from social benefits with the latter divided 
into seven (policy) fields: family policy related components (FP), education (ED), old 
age (OA), minimum income (MI), disability & invalidity (DI), housing (HO), other 
social benefits (OS). In the first category we distinguish measures relating to earnings 
(ER), capital income (CI), real estate (RE), and private provisions and transfers (PP). 
 
3.2.1  Income exempt from PIT 
Exemptions include in almost all countries child and family benefits. Greece is the 
only country in which these benefits are taxable. Also social assistance and minimum 
income provisions are in most countries tax exempt. The countries that include social 
assistance benefits in their taxable income are Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Spain. Study allowances and housing benefits are in general also 
excluded from taxable income. Many countries also exclude benefits for disability and 
invalidity from taxation. In four countries unemployment benefits are partly or 
entirely tax exempt, namely in Austria, Germany, Ireland and Portugal.  
 
Pensions are in all countries part of taxable income, though as we will see, specific tax 
advantages available to the elderly can significantly reduce their tax burden 
(sometimes to zero). 
 
3.2.2  Imputed taxable income 
For some countries we had to introduce a category of imputed taxable income. This is 
done as some income components are part of taxable income, but not of gross income. 
The best example here is imputed values of real estate property (Belgium, Italy and 
the Netherlands). They are no part of standard disposable income, and hence not of 
gross income, but in some countries they have to be included to calculate taxes. In our 
calculations these income components are included in the category of exemptions.  
  6 
3.2.3  Deductions 
In most countries social insurance contributions are deducted before taxes are 
calculated. This is however not the case in Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK, and 
only partially in France and Germany. 
 
The majority of deductions are granted to market income: most countries provide the 
deduction of work-related expenditures, or try to stimulate the acquisition of real 
estate. Work-related expenses are not deductible in Denmark, Greece, Ireland (which 
has provided a tax allowance, though, for this aim), Spain (which uses a tax credit in 
this respect) and the UK. Stimulating the acquisition of real estate is mainly done 
through the application of mortgage interest deductions, as is the case in Belgium, 
Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands. In some countries maintenance payments are 
also deductible (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). 
 
Deductions of the policy-related category are related to old age or to family policy. 
Old age deductions are very prominent in Germany, and exist in Finland, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. Family related 
deductions are provided in Austria, Belgium, France and Luxembourg. 
  7Table 3: Overview of exemptions, deductions, allowances and credits in the personal income tax systems in the EU-15, EUROMOD, 1998. 
 




Austria  FP: Child benefits; Pregnancy benefit; 
Maternity allowance; Care benefits;  
ED: Study allowances;  
MI: Social assistance; 
OA: Private pension benefit payments;  
OS: Unemployment benefits; 
HO: Housing benefits; 
CI:  Investment Income;  
PP: Private transfers received,  
- SIC; 
ER: Cost of earnings and limited; 









FP: General; Child tax; 
Lone parent; single earners;  
OA: pensioner; 
ER: Commuters’; income 
tax reduction; wage earners; 
progression adjustment 
Neg.: Preferential tax of 
other earnings 
Belgium  FP: Child benefit, Birth/adoption allocation; 
ED: Study allowances; 
MI: Minimum income;  
MI & OA: Minimum income for old persons;  
DI: Allocation for handicapped people;  
PP: 20% of maintenance payments received.  
Imputed rent; 40% 
of property income 
FP: Marital quotient (pos/neg); 
PP: Maintenance paid (80%); 
SIC; 
ER: Professional expenses; 
RE: Mortgage interest; dwelling 
allowances; 
-  FP: Basic (for single/ 
spouses); Family credits (for 
children, handicapped, lone 
parents);  
OA & OS: Replacement 
income tax credit; Zero tax 
for low replacement 
incomes. 
Denmark  FP: Child benefit; Family allowances; Day 
care subsidies; 
ED: Study allowances;  
HO: Housing benefits;  
DI: Part of disability pensions;  
Lump sum income  PP:  alimony received for children; 
SIC; 
RE: mortgage interest; 
-    -
Finland  FP: Child benefits; Child day care payments; 
Home care benefits;  
MI: Social assistance;  
DI: Military injury compensation  
HO: Housing benefits;  
CI: Part of investment Income; 
PP: Maintenance payments received; 
ER: Part of self-employment income 
-  OA: pension deduction; 
SIC; 
ER: work-related expenses; travel 
expenses; Income losses; for 
sailors; 
RE: mortgage interest 
 
-  DI: Disability; 
PP: Child maintenance; 
CI: Deficit capital 
compensation (including 
mortgage interest) 
 8 EXEMPTIONS  IMPUTED 
TAXABLE 
INCOME 
DEDUCTIONS ALLOWANCES  CREDITS 
France  FP: Family benefits;  Lone parent benefit;  
MI: Minimum income; Minimum pension; 
Social aid; 
OA: Social benefit for dependent elderly; 
DI: Allocation for handicapped people; 
Invalidity pension; War pension;  
CI: Investment income; Property income;  
PP: Maintenance payments received. 
-  FP: Personal deduction; 
OA: Pensions deductions; 
SIC: Partly; 
ER: Professional expenses. 
. 
-  ER: Low incomes;  
various types (imputed) 
Germany  FP: Child benefits;  
ED: Study allowances; 
MI: Social assistance;  
OA: Nursing home insurance premia received; 
OS: Unemployment allowances 
HO: Housing benefits 
-  OA: Civil servant pensions; Old 
age; Non-earnings part of non-civil 
servant pensions  
CI: Investment income;  
PP: Maintenance payments 
ER: Expenditures; Professional 
expenses; 
FP: Children; 
Lone parents  
- 
Greece  ED: Study allowances;  
HO: Housing benefits; 
Lump sum income  PP : Medical expenses; private 
education expenditure ; 
SIC ; 
RE : Mortgage interest; Rent. 
-  FP: Children; Household 
expenditure;  
OA: private pension 
contributions 
Ireland  FP: Child benefits; Maternity contributory 
benefits; Orphan’s contributory benefits; 
Carer’s non-contributory benefits; Family 
Income Supplement; 
ED: Study allowances;  
MI: social minimum; 
DI: Invalidity and disability contributory 
benefits; 
OS: most of unemployment benefits; 
HO: Housing benefits; 
PP: Maintenance payments received;  




OA: Age;  
ER: Employee 
PP: permanent health 
insurance relief  
RE: Mortgage interest relief 
 9 EXEMPTIONS  IMPUTED 
TAXABLE 
INCOME 
DEDUCTIONS ALLOWANCES  CREDITS 
Italy  FP: Family allowances;  
MI: Social pension; 
DI: War pension; Disability benefits; 
OS: Social security benefits from local 
authorities; 
CI: 15% of property income; 
PP: Maintenance payments received;  
Imputed cadastral 
values 
SIC: Employee;  
ER: Expenditures deductions; 
RE: Owner occupied house 
deduction 
-  FP: Dependent spouse; 
Children; Lone parents; 
Other dependants; 
PP: Insurance; 
ER: Work-related expenses; 
RE: Mortgage interest 
Luxembourg  FP: Child benefits; Pre-, postnatal and birth 
allowances; Maternity payments; Orphan 
allowance; Care benefits; 
ED: Study, education and school allowances;  
DI: Seriously disabled persons benefits; 
Permanent accident benefit;  
OS: sickness replacement salary/wage; other 
benefits from the Fonds National de 
Solidarité; Other public benefits;  
HO: Housing benefits;  
-  FP: lone parents; child & family 
care; 
OA: pensioners;  
CI: property income; LUX 
investment income + related costs  
SIC 
ER: wage-earners;  ‘professional’ 
couples; expenditures; disabled 
(employees); farmers; agricultural 
salaried workers; accessory income 
-  FP: Children; 
MI: Tax adjustment for low 
incomes 
Neg.: Additional 
unemployment insurance tax 
Netherlands  FP: Child benefits;  
ED: Study allowances;  
HO: Housing benefits;  
PP: Maintenance payments received for 
children; 
Use of car from 
employer; imputed 
income from owner 
occupied house 
OA: pension contributions; 
CI: amounts in special savings 
accounts 
PP: part of maintenance payments; 
ER: Professional expenses; Self-
employment income;  
RE: mortgage interest  
FP: basic tax 
free amounts; 
single parent;  




Portugal  FP: Child benefits; Family benefits; 
ED: Study allowances;  
MI: Social assistance; Income supplement to 
ensure minimum income; 
OS: Unemployment benefits; 
HO: Housing benefits;  
CI: investment income; property income; 
PP: Maintenance payments;  
Lump sum income  OA: for pension income; 
SIC  
ER: for (self-)employment income;  
RE: Housing debt;  
 
-  FP: For tax unit composition 
 10 EXEMPTIONS  IMPUTED 
TAXABLE 
INCOME 
DEDUCTIONS ALLOWANCES  CREDITS 
Spain  FP: Child benefit  -  CI: for Employment income; Part 
of investment income; 
SIC 
-  FP: Children; dependent 
parent;  
OA: elderly inactive; 
ER: employment income; 
RE: rents; mortgage 
Sweden  FP: Child benefits; 
ED: University/Study grants; Educational 
benefits; 
MI: Social assistance; 
OA: Non-taxable pension; 
OS: Sick benefit self-employed; Residual tax 
free benefits; 
HO: Housing benefits; 
CI: Investment income; part of self-
employment income 
PP: Maintenance payments;  
-  OA: Pension contributions; 
PP: Periodic maintenance 
payments; 
SIC 
ER: Basic/special deduction; 
Work-related travelling; New 
started company  
-  CI: Reduction on capital; 
UK  FP: Child benefit; Family Credit; Attendance 
allowance; 
ED: Study allowances; Training allowance 
MI: Income Support;  
DI: Disability & incapacity allowances; 
HO: Housing benefits; 
CI: Part of investment income; 
PP: Maintenance payments received;  
-  OA: Private pension contributions  FP: Personal;  
OA: Age-
related personal  
FP: Married persons; Lone 
parents 
OA: Age-related married 
person;  
RE: Mortgage intrest tax 
relief (refundable). 
FP = Family Policy related; ED = Education; MI= Minimum Income; OA = Old Age; DI = Disability & Invalidity; OS = Other Social benefits; HO = Housing; CI = Capital 
Income; PP = Private Provisions & Transfers; SIC = Social Insurance Contributions; ER = Earnings Related; RE = Real Estate; Neg. = Negative
 113.2.4  Allowances in PIT:  
Allowances are not used very much. The only three countries that have allowances of 
some substance are Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK and they use them mainly for 
old age and family policy. Many countries however have a zero rate band in the tax 
schedule (e.g. Greece, Sweden); even though this is not labelled in the tax law as an 
allowance, it can be considered as one. This illustrates again that it is not always 
evident to categorise the different tax measures. 
 
3.2.5  Tax Credits in PIT: 
Tax credits are frequently used in the framework of family policy and old age 
provisions. Austria, Belgium, Greece, Spain and UK have tax credits in both these 
fields; Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal have only family related provisions. Some 
countries also use tax credits for the benefit of earners (Austria, France, Italy and 
Spain) and as a mortgage interest relief (Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and UK). In 
some countries tax credits are refundable (or non-wastable), i.e. if the tax credit 
exceeds tax liability, the amount of the excess is paid to the taxpayer (e.g. family 
credit in the UK). This fits in a tendency in some countries to administer benefit 
payments through the tax system. 
 
Sometimes special taxes are levied in the framework of personal income taxes; these 
are treated as negative tax credits. This is the case in Austria with a preferential tax on 
other earnings and in Luxembourg with the additional unemployment insurance tax. 
 
3.2.6  Rate structure of PIT: 
 
Table 4: Overview of the rate structure in the personal income tax systems in the EU-15, 
EUROMOD, 1998. 
  Number of bands  Lowest tariff  Highest tariff 
Austria 5  10  50 




1 4 0  29 
Finland
1 7 0  38 
France 6  0  54 
Germany ²
  - 19  53 
Greece 6  0  45 
Ireland 2  24  46 
Italy 5  18.5  45.5 
Luxembourg 18 0 46 
Netherlands 3  7.1  60.0 
Portugal 4  15  40 
Spain 9  0  56 
Sweden
1 2 0  25 
UK 3  20  40 
1 For the Scandinavian countries, these tax rates do not include local taxes. These local taxes are 
proportional, and the tax rate varies according to locality. In EUROMOD an average local tax rate is 
applied for Denmark (32.4%) and Finland (17.5%); for Sweden the distinct local rates are used. 
² The tax schedule is not based on tax bands, but on a polynomial. 
 
In table 4 we present the structure of the rate schedule as it is integrated in 
EUROMOD 1998. These are only the rates that apply in the national personal income 
tax systems. This explains the low values for the highest tariffs in the Scandinavian 
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do not. Here it becomes again apparent that it is not always easy to demarcate the 
various tax components in the PIT system: some countries grant tax credits that fulfil 
a similar role as the zero tax band (e.g. the basic tax credit in Belgium).  
 
3.3  Other taxes 
Other taxes are those direct taxes on household income that are not part of the national 
personal income tax system. Broadly, two groups of ‘other taxes’ can be 
distinguished: local taxes (Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, UK) and taxes on 
income from real estate and financial assets (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Sweden). The coverage of local taxes in EUROMOD, however, is not 
universal. Sometime, these taxes exist, but because of a lack of data they are not 
covered.  
 
As we have already mentioned, local taxes are very important in the Scandinavian 
countries, whereas the weight of ‘other taxes’ in most countries is relatively small. 
 
 
Table 5: Other taxes on income in the EU-15, EUROMOD, 1998 
Country Other  taxes 
Austria  Withholding tax on capital income; church tax 
Belgium Property  tax 
Denmark Local  tax 
Finland  Local tax; Wealth tax; Church tax; Tax on Capital income; Tax from deposit interest 
France  Capital income taxes; Local and regional taxes 
Germany  Solidarity surplus tax 
Greece - 
Ireland - 
Italy  Taxes on financial assets (dividends, bonds, deposits) 
Luxembourg - 
Netherlands - 
Portugal Capital  income 
Spain - 
Sweden  Local; Real estate; Investment; Wealth 
UK  Local council tax 
 
 
4  Measuring the redistributive effect of taxes 
 
Following common practice in the literature we use the term “redistributive effect of 
taxes” for the change in income inequality achieved through taxes. In general, the 
redistributive effect of taxes depends on the one hand on the departure from 
proportionality, i.e. the degree of progressivity, and on the other hand on the tax level, 
measured by the average tax rate. A tax system is called progressive when the 
proportion of income that is taken in tax increases with income (i.e. the average tax 
rate increases with income). The tax system is called proportional when the average 
rate is constant, and it is said to be regressive when the average rate decreases with 
rising income (i.e. when the lower income individuals bear a relatively higher part of 
the tax burden). When measuring the redistributive effect of taxes, we (implicitly) 
compare the existing tax system with a proportional tax that yields the same revenue 
  13as this actual tax system, so the given total amount of income does not change. This 
(hypothetical) proportional tax is distributionally neutral, as it preserves the relative 
pre-tax income differences
5. The measurement of the redistributive effect and 
progressivity in the Lorenz curve framework was initiated by Musgrave et al. (1948) 
and Kakwani (1977a and b). In this section we present the most important tools used 
to measure the redistributive impact of tax instruments
6. Most measures are designed 
for evaluating the effect of taxes, but mutatis mutandis they can also be applied to 
social benefits (see Duclos (1993), Verbist (2002)).  
 
4.1  Measurement of progressivity and redistributive effect of taxes 
A very popular index of progressivity is the one proposed by Kakwani (1977a) which 
measures the departure from proportionality as the difference between the 
concentration coefficient of taxes and the Gini of pre-tax income: 
(1)    X T
K
T G C − = Π
 
For measuring the redistributive effect we will use the Reynolds-Smolensky (1977) 
index, which equals the difference between the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income and 
the concentration coefficient of post-tax income: 
(2)    T X X
RS C G − − = Π
 
There is a close link between the measures of progressivity and those of redistributive 
effect (Kakwani, 1977a). The redistributive effect appears to be a function of 













Up until now we have assumed that the tax system does not produce changes in the 
rank order of the income units, i.e. that it makes no difference whether income units 
are ranked in ascending order of their pre-tax or their post-tax income. But due to 
differences in tax treatment of income units it is possible that some of them swap 
positions in the income ranking. Reranking can be measured as the difference between 
the concentration coefficient of net income, CN, and the Gini coefficient, GN 
(Atkinson (1980), Plotnick (1981)). The Reynolds-Smolensky index is then an 
indicator of vertical equity VE, i.e. it measures the total reduction of inequality that 
would occur if there were no reranking of income units
7. The index D = GN  - CN 
measures how much of this equalising effect is ‘undone’ by reranking. Thus, the total 
redistributive effect is the result of a vertical equity (VE) and a reranking effect (RR): 
(4)  RE = GX – GN = VE - RR = Π
RS – D 
 
 
                                                 
5 This applies only within the framework of scale-invariant inequality measures, which are used here. 
6 More details on the derivation of these formulae can be found in appendix 2. 
7 Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) consider reranking as a measure of horizontal inequity of the tax 
system. Some authors also distinguish “pure horizontal inequity”, i.e. the unequal treatment of equals 
that does not automatically results in reranking (see e.g. Lambert et al., 1993). As the empirical 
implementation is problematic (e.g. how to define “equals”, see also Wagstaff et al, 1999a)), we did not 
follow this approach 
  144.2  Decomposition of tax progressivity 
As progressivity is one of the important determinants of the redistributive effect, we 
analyse it in more detail. Progressivity can be decomposed over the different factors 
that build up a tax system. 
 
4.2.1  Decomposition of Progressivity of  Total Taxes 
In all countries we consider here there are different types of taxes. Progressivity of 
total taxes results from the progressivity characteristics of these different individual 
taxes. Kakwani (1977a) showed that progressivity of total taxes can also be measured 
as the weighted sum of the Kakwani indices of these individual taxes: 









4.2.2  Decomposition of Progressivity of  Personal Income Taxes 
The personal income tax schedule is a complex of various measures (see tables 3 and 
4). The effect of the different components can be measured by using decomposition 
formulae that make clear how the rate structure and the various tax advantages 
contribute to overall progressivity and redistribution. We use the analytical framework 
presented in Pfähler (1990) and Loizides (1988). Other decompositions are possible, 
but this one has the advantage that it follows the logic of the tax system. The 
transition from pre-tax income X to taxable income Y  can be represented as (cf. 
section 2):  
  Y = X - E - A - D(X) 
Net (or disposable) income is N =X -[ r(X - E - A - D(X)) - K] = X – Tpit 
 
Progressivity of (net) personal income tax liabilities (or shortly ‘net progressivity’) 
results from the effect of gross tax liabilities minus that of tax credits, as Tpit = Tg –K. 
The average tax rate is  , where t k t t g pit − = g is the average rate of gross tax liabilities 














g PIT Π + Π = Π  
K
Tg Π is the Kakwani index of gross tax liabilities.  shows the degree of 
disproportionality of tax credits K relative to the distribution of pre-tax income, or 
. A positive Kakwani index of tax credits indicates that the tax credit 





K C G − = Π
 
Progressivity of gross tax liabilities (or ‘gross progressivity’) results on the one hand 
from the effect of the tax rate structure, which we call ‘direct progressivity’, and on 
the other hand from the effect of the tax base structure, which is ‘indirect 
progressivity’
8: 
                                                 
8 The terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ progressivity come from Pfähler (1990), but the content is not 
exactly the same. Pfähler defines direct progressivity as CT-CY , which means that it contains both the 
pure rate effect and the effect of tax credits, whereas we reserve the term for the pure rate effect 
. For indirect progressivity, Pfähler uses the expression C Y C T C g − E+A+D -GX, i.e. progressivity of tax-
free income w.r.t. pre-tax income. 
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K
Tg G C C C − + − = Π
The first term of this formula measures direct progressivity, which follows from the 
progressive tax rate schedule applied on taxable income. We call this the pure rate 
effect, which is represented by the index
9: 
(8)    Y T
K
R C C g − = Π
 
The second term looks at indirect progressivity, which is caused by taxable income 
falling short of pre-tax income and is measured by CY - GX. Gross tax liability Tg= 
r(Y) is calculated on taxable income Y = X - E - A - D(X), i.e. income after subtraction 
of exempt income E, tax allowances A and tax deductions D(X). Analogously with (6) 























with  h  e as the average rate of exempt income and   measuring the  
disproportionality of exempt income; 
E X
K
E C G − = Π
a as the average rate of allowances and   measuring the 
disproportionality of allowances; 
A X
K
A C G − = Π • 
•  d  as the average rate of deductions, and  , measuring the 
disproportionality of deductions. 
D X
K
D C G − = Π
Just as with tax credits, a positive value of  ,   and  corresponds with 
exemptions, allowances and deductions benefiting relatively more to lower incomes, 



































The explanation above shows clearly that the measures of redistributive effect and 
progressivity are sensitive to the definition of the base income concept (i.e. X). In this 
paper we use a broad definition for the base income concept, namely gross income. 
But it is also possible to use market income (e.g. if one wants to investigate the 
redistributive effect of taxes and benefits jointly) or taxable income. Changing the 
income concept will lead to other results (see e.g. Verbist 2002 for a comparison of 
progressivity of taxes in Belgium with gross income and market income as the base 
income concept). 
 
4.3  Equivalence scale 
The household is considered as the relevant unit of analysis as most people live in 
family groups and households pool resources. We use an equivalence scale to take 
account of household composition. We only look at the distribution between 
                                                 
9 For some countries the rate effect we will measure here includes also other elements. For Austria and 
Germany it also captures the effect that unemployment benefits are tax exempt. In some countries there 
exists the option to have individual or joint taxation (e.g. Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain; see also 
O’Donoghue et al. 1999); the effect of this distinction is measured in the rate effect. This is also the 
case for the “quotient familial” in France. For the UK the effect of the special tax rate for investment 
income is also included in the rate effect, and in Ireland it also includes the effect of the marginal relief. 
These remarks have to be born in mind when interpreting the results. 
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distributed equally over the household members, which means that all household 
members attain the same welfare level. This is a (debatable but) standard assumption 
(see a.o. Coulter et al., 1992; Cowell and Mercader-Prats, 1999). 
 
Income (components) are corrected for differences in household size and composition 
with the modified OECD-scale. According to this equivalence scale the first adult has 
a value 1, every other adult counts for 0.5 and each child for 0.3. We analyse 
inequality of equivalent household income weighted for the number of individuals. 
This means that we attribute equivalent household income to every individual 
household member, so that in fact measurement is performed on the individual 
equivalent household income distribution. Cowell (1984) argues that this is the best 
approach as “presumably social welfare depends on the well-being of individual 
persons, regardless of the units in which they happen to live, the alliances they form 
or whether or not they live at home”. 
 
 
5   The redistributive effect of taxes in the EU 
 
We will first compare the different components of taxes in the EU. We look at the 
transition from gross to net income as it is modelled in EUROMOD. This means that 
we analyse the effect of taxes on income inequality.  
 
5.1  Redistributive effect of total taxes 
Using formulae (4) and (3) we can calculate for each country the effect on income 
inequality of total taxes. Taxes reduce income inequality in all countries, though 
unsurprisingly not to the same extent (table 6).  
 
 
Table  6: Redistributive effect (RE) of total taxes in EU countries, EUROMOD, 1998, 
equivalised incomes. 
  GX GN RE  RE as % 
of GX
VE  K
T Π   t 
Austria  0.3133 0.2526 0.0607  19.4  0.0639 0.1689 0.2745 
Belgium  0.3146 0.2408 0.0737  23.4  0.0780 0.2330 0.2509 
Denmark  0.3010 0.2411 0.0599  19.9  0.0625 0.0985 0.3881 
Finland  0.2893 0.2329 0.0563  19.5  0.0597 0.1411 0.2972 
France  0.3170 0.2847 0.0323  10.2  0.0345 0.1320 0.2071 
Germany  0.3331 0.2760 0.0571  17.2  0.0664 0.1684 0.2827 
Greece 0.3748  0.3417  0.0331 8.8 0.0353  0.1492 0.1913 
Ireland  0.3753 0.3202 0.0551  14.7  0.0568 0.2676 0.1750 
Italy  0.3779 0.3411 0.0368  9.8  0.0390 0.1219 0.2426 
Luxembourg 0.3183 0.2566 0.0617  19.4  0.0630 0.2398 0.2081 
Netherlands  0.2955 0.2496 0.0459  15.5  0.0484 0.1198 0.2877 
Portugal  0.4044 0.3561 0.0483  12.0  0.0499 0.2098 0.1920 
Spain  0.3689 0.3311 0.0398  10.3  0.0398 0.1792 0.1817 
Sweden  0.2984 0.2662 0.0323  10.8  0.0401 0.0891 0.3103 
UK  0.3590 0.3133 0.0457  12.7  0.0474 0.1884 0.2009 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
We can distinguish three groups in their redistributive efforts through taxes: 
  17High RE: Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland, Germany, Luxembourg 
Moderate RE: Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 
Low RE:  France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden 
It is not obvious to draw a line in these results. It is not the case that all Scandinavian 
countries have a high RE: Sweden is situated in the group with a low RE. Maybe the 
strongest line is that almost all the Southern European countries have a low RE, with 
the exception of Portugal that is found in the moderate group. In this last group we 
also find the two English-speaking countries, UK and Ireland. It is remarkable that 
also according to EUROMOD Belgium attains the highest degree of inequality 
reduction, both in absolute and relative terms. 
 
For most countries RE is broadly the same as vertical equity (VE); the only exceptions 
are Germany and Sweden where inequality reduction is more strongly counteracted 
through reranking. Thus, as vertical equity is by far the most important factor, we will 
look more closely at the building stones of vertical equity, i.e. progressivity and tax 
level, measured respectively by the Kakwani index and the average tax rate. 
 
5.2  Average tax rates 
The average rate of total taxes results of course from the total of the three tax types 
(see table 7). The average tax rate is very high in Scandinavia, Germany and the 
Netherlands. In the Scandinavian countries this follows from the high level of local 
taxes. In Germany, the high tax level is due to mainly PIT (tax rate of 0.1453) and 
SIC (0.1294), whereas in the Netherlands SIC are more predominant (0.1746). The 
average tax rate is also high in Austria, Belgium and Italy, following for two thirds 
from PIT in these last two countries, thus scoring in fact the highest average PIT rates. 
 
 
Table 7:  Weight of taxes as a % of gross income, and the proportion of the three tax types in 
total taxes in the EU-15 countries, EUROMOD, 1998, equivalised incomes. 
  Total taxes  Personal Income Taxes  Social Insurance 
Contributions 
Other taxes 




as % of t  average 
rate 
as % of t  average 
rate 
as % of t 
Austria 0.2745  0.1490  54.3  0.1247  45.4  0.0008  0.3 
Belgium 0.2509  0.1677  66.8  0.0831  33.1  0.0002  0.1 
Denmark 0.3881  0.0808  20.8  0.0844  21.7  0.2228  57.4 
Finland 0.2972  0.0816  27.5  0.0604  20.3  0.1552  52.2 
France 0.2071  0.0359  17.3  0.1472  71.1  0.0240  11.6 
Germany 0.2827  0.1453  51.4  0.1294  45.8  0.0080  2.8 
Greece 0.1913  0.1096  57.3  0.0817  42.7  -  - 
Ireland 0.1750  0.1435  82.0  0.0315  18.0  -  - 
Italy 0.2426  0.1591  65.6  0.0660  27.2  0.0175  7.2 
Luxembourg 0.2081  0.1270  61.0  0.0812  39.0  -  - 
Netherlands 0.2877 0.1131 39.3  0.1746  60.7  -  - 
Portugal 0.1920  0.1050  54.7  0.0813  42.3  0.0057  3.0 
Spain 0.1817  0.1396  76.8  0.0421  23.2  -  - 
Sweden 0.3103  0.0246  7.9  0.0430  13.9  0.2427  78.2 
UK 0.2009  0.1336  66.5  0.0452  22.5  0.0220  11.0 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
The highest SIC-rates are found in Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, 
ranging from 12.5% to 17.5% of gross income. Ireland, Spain, Sweden, UK have the 
lowest SIC-rates (between 3.2% and 4.5% of gross income). 
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the case for the Scandinavian countries and for France and the Netherlands. For these 
last two countries, social insurance contributions have the biggest weight (resp. 71.1% 
and 60.7% of total taxes), whereas for other countries this proportion varies between 
14% (Sweden) and 46% (Germany).  In Denmark, Finland and Sweden other taxes, 
which are mainly local taxes, are the most important tax type (ranging from 52% to 
78% of total taxes). In the UK, France and Italy, ‘other taxes’ have some weight 
(more than 5% of total taxes), but in all other countries these taxes are relatively small 
or non-existent. 
 
5.3  Progressivity of the three tax categories 
The tax types do not only differ in weight, but there is also quite some diversity in 
structure. In this section we compare progressivity of the three tax types over the EU-
15. The Kakwani indices of total taxes range from 0.0891 in Sweden to 0.2676 in 
Ireland. This general figure results from the progressivity characteristics of the three 
different tax types, which can be disentangled with formula (5). 
 
Table 8:  Kakwani indices of total taxes and the three tax types in the EU-15, 1998. 





Austria 0.1689  0.2961  0.0172  0.1274 
Belgium 0.2330  0.2797  0.1398  -0.2613 
Denmark 0.0985  0.1831  0.0855  0.0727 
Finland 0.1411  0.2784  0.1004  0.0848 
France 0.1320  0.4401  0.0713  0.0441 
Germany 0.1684  0.2842  0.0313  0.2842 
Greece 0.1492  0.2928  -0.0436  - 
Ireland 0.2676  0.2917  0.1575  - 
Italy 0.1219  0.1562  0.0444  0.1033 
Luxembourg 0.2398  0.3907 0.0037  - 
Netherlands 0.1198  0.3268  -0.0143  - 
Portugal 0.2098  0.3250  0.0558  0.2852 
Spain 0.1792  0.2622  -0.0963  - 
Sweden 0.0891  0.4774  0.0388  0.0587 
UK 0.1884  0.2594  0.1248  -0.1121 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
We find a wide variety in Kakwani indices for tax types and countries. One fact is 
clear: PIT is in all countries the most progressive tax type. PIT is very progressive in 
Sweden, France and Luxembourg, with Kakwani indices of resp. 0.4771, 0.4401 and 
0.3907. Progressivity of PIT is rather low in Italy (0.1562) and Denmark (0.1831). In 
section 5 we will analyse these results in more detail. 
 
Social insurance contributions are in most countries proportional. Exceptions are 
Ireland (0.1575), Belgium (0.1398) and UK (0.1248). Most countries levy social 
contributions as a fixed percentage of income. Ireland and the UK apply lower and 
upper boundaries for these contributions; apparently the effect of the lower boundary 
is strongest as contributions in those contributions tend rather towards progressivity. 
There is an additional SIC rate for high incomes in Finland, whereas in Belgium the 
lowest pensions do not pay SIC; these factors probably explain why SIC in both these 
countries also incline towards progressivity. Spain also applies lower and upper 
bounds for the calculation SIC, but contrary to the Anglo-Saxon countries the effect 
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regressivity. 
 
Other taxes are progressive in Germany, Austria, Italy and Portugal. In Germany 
‘other taxes’ consist of the solidarity surplus tax, which is a surcharge on PIT, so it 
has the same value of Kakwani as personal income taxes. For the other three countries 
this category includes mainly taxes on capital income or financial assets; as these 
taxes are relatively more present among higher incomes, ‘other taxes’ have a 
progressive structure. Other taxes are regressive in Belgium (regional tax on property) 
and UK (local council tax). In the other countries, other taxes are proportional. 
 
5.4  Contribution to total tax progressivity 
Using formula (5) we can also calculate the contribution of each tax type to overall 
progressivity. The contribution to overall progressivity depends on the features of the 
individual instruments.  For personal income taxes we will discuss the effect of the 
various income tax components into more detail in section 6. The effect of social 
insurance contributions will depend on the structure of the system (e.g. the existence 
of lower and upper bounds), but also on the structure of the underlying income 
distribution (e.g. the weight of low- and high-income groups). We expect that a lower 
bound will make social insurance contributions more progressive, whereas a ceiling 
will probably lead to regressivity. In countries where there is both a ceiling and a 
floor, the final effect will depend on the level of the SIC boundaries and on the weight 
of high and low income groups
10. As the base income concept here is gross income, 
the degree of progressivity of social insurance contributions also depends on the 
weight of the income components on which SIC are levied. For the interpretation of 
the results we also have to bear in mind that there is a considerable difference in logic 
between personal income taxes and social insurance contributions. In general, 
personal income taxes are levied to fulfil the government revenue requirements for a 
specific time period (mostly a year, and can thus be considered as redistributive in a 
specific period), whereas social insurance contributions are part of a social insurance 
system, and thus redistribute over the life-cycle rather than between income groups in 
any given period. 
 
Personal income taxes deliver in each country a positive contribution. The fact that in 
all countries PIT have the highest Kakwani, combined with the fact that in many 
countries their average tax rate is the highest of the three types (in 10 of the 15 
countries) leads to PIT delivering the highest contribution to overall progressivity of 
total taxes (more than 80% in 11 countries, even up to 112% in Greece and Spain). 
The notable exceptions are the Scandinavian countries and France. 
 
For the Scandinavian countries, local taxes deliver a very important contribution to 
overall progressivity, which follows mainly from their high average other tax rate, not 
so much from their progressivity as they all have a relatively low Kakwani for their 
local taxes. 
 
                                                 
10 It also important to note here that the degree of progressivity also depends on the measure used. We 
work here within the standard Gin framework. Using for instance inequality measures with other 
inequality preferences, will lead to different results (see Immervoll, 2004). 
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of total taxes = 100%), EU-15, 1998. 
  Personal Income Taxes  Social Insurance Contributions  Other taxes 
 Contribution  as %  Contribution  as %  Contribution  as % 
Austria 0.1607  95.2  0.0078  4.6  0.0004  0.2 
Belgium 0.1869  80.2  0.0463  19.9  -0.0002  -0.1 
Denmark 0.0381  38.7  0.0186  18.9  0.0417  42.4 
Finland 0.0765  54.2  0.0204  14.4  0.0443  31.4 
France 0.0762  57.7  0.0507  38.4  0.0051  3.9 
Germany 0.1461  86.7  0.0143  8.5  0.0080  4.8 
Greece 0.1678  112.5  -0.0186  -12.5  -  - 
Ireland 0.2393  89.4  0.0283  10.6  -  - 
Italy 0.1024  84.0  0.0121  9.9  0.0074  6.1 
Luxembourg 0.2384  99.4  0.0014  0.6  -  - 
Netherlands 0.1285 107.2  -0.0086  -7.2  -  - 
Portugal 0.1778  84.7  0.0236  11.3  0.0084  4.0 
Spain 0.2015  112.4  -0.0233  -12.4  -  - 
Sweden 0.0379  42.5  0.0054  6.0  0.0459  51.5 
UK 0.1726  91.6  0.0281  14.9  -0.0123  -6.5 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
SIC are very important in France (mainly due to the high tax rate). But also in 
Belgium and Denmark they give an important positive contribution to inequality 
reduction. In Greece and Spain the impact is clearly negative, following from the 
negative Kakwani index; this means that total progressivity, and thus the 
redistributive effect, would be bigger if there were no social insurance contributions. 
 
As we have already mentioned local taxes are important in the Scandinavian 
countries, and this is also reflected in the large share of ‘other taxes’. In other 
countries this tax type has only a small impact. It is still around 6% in Italy and UK. 
In Italy other taxes enhance equality, whereas in the UK they are anti-equalising. This 
last result is remarkable; despite the council tax benefit, which is designed to provide 
relief for the lowest income groups, the local council tax in the UK is regressive.  
 
5.5  Is there a trade-off between tax progressivity and tax level? 
In this section we will deal with two issues. On the one hand we want to know if there 
is a relationship between initial inequality and redistributive efforts. On the other 
hand, we will test here on the basis of the EUROMOD-data the trade-off hypothesis 
formulated in section 2. It would not be illogical to have a correlation between pre-tax 
income inequality and the redistributive effect of taxes. This correlation can be 
positive: countries with a high pre-tax income inequality may tend to put more effort 
in redistribution. If market forces lead to relatively big inequalities, this may be a 
reason for the government to interfere more strongly and correct this distribution. But 
also the opposite stand can be defended: an initially unequal distribution and the 
social choice to redistribute rather little can be based on the same underlying factors, 
such as a strong emphasis on individual responsibility and a big confidence in the 
market. The results presented in section 3 indicated a positive relationship, though it 
was not significant. With EUROMOD we find that the sign of the correlation 
coefficient favours the second supposition, namely that countries with a high level of 
pre-tax inequality redistribute rather less. However, also this correlation is not 
significant. There is also no significant correlation between GX and  . But there is 
quite a strong correlation between initial inequality and the average tax rate. This can 
be seen as an indication in favour of the second supposition. 
K
T Π
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The hypothesis of a trade-off between progressivity and tax level seems to rest on 
firmer ground. Just as in section 2 we find a significantly negative correlation between 
these two variables. This negative correlation applies both for total taxes as for 
personal income taxes. However, the classification of countries according to the trade-
off hypothesis is not the same. For total taxes we can broadly identify a group of “low 
progressivity – high tax rate” countries (with the Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands and Italy), and a group of  “high progressivity – low tax rate” countries 
(with Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, the UK and Spain) (see  table 6). Austria and 
Germany occupy a position in between and Belgium again combines a high degree of 
progressivity with a moderate tax rate. Greece and France have a combination of low 
progressivity with a low tax level.  
 
Table 10:  Correlation between inequality, redistributive effect, progressivity and tax level, 
EU-15, EUROMOD, 1998. 
Variables   Pearson rank correlation coefficient   (t-values) 
GX – RE  -0.3129 (-1.188)  
GX – t  -0.7294 (-3.845)
**
GX -   
K
T Π 0.4198 (1.668)  
t -    
K
T Π -0.6486 (-3.073)
**
tPIT -   
K
PIT
T Π -0.6255 (-2.890)
*
tSIC -   
K
SIC
T Π -0.0769 (-0.278)
 
* Significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.005 level 
 
For personal income taxes solely the correlation coefficient is –0.6255 and 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.  The “low-progressivity – high tax 
rate” group for PIT include Italy, the UK, Spain, Belgium and Germany, whereas 
Sweden, France, Portugal, Greece and the Netherlands belong to the “high 
progressivity – low tax rate” countries. Denmark and Finland have a low score on 
both variables, while the other countries take up a position somewhere in the middle. 
The trade-off hypothesis does not hold for social insurance contributions: there is no 
systematic relation between the average SIC rate and SIC progressivity. 
 
 
6  Progressivity of personal income taxes in the EU 
 
Personal income taxes are in most countries the most important contributor to the 
redistributive effect of taxes in the EU-15. Therefore, we will go into more depth how 
this comes about. We have already pointed out that the PIT system is a complex of 
various measures (exemptions, allowances etc.). In this sections we apply the 
decomposition explained in section 4 and study how these various components 
contribute to PIT progressivity. As we have seen, there is a wide variety among 
countries in the composition of the tax base, in the kind of tax advantages that are 
granted (allowances, deductions and credits) and the structure of the rate schedule. So 
progressivity in the EU will result from different instruments. 
 
  226.1  Proportion of the components in gross income 
Taxable income (i.e. the income on which the rate structure is applied) is between 
53% (France) and 91% (Spain) of gross income. The gap between taxable and gross 
income follows in general mainly from deductions. The only exceptions are Finland 
and Italy, where exemptions are more important and Ireland, the Netherlands and the 
UK that use allowances of some substance. These allowances relate mainly to the 
field of family policy in these three countries (cf. table 3). Deductions are very 
important (+20%) in Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal; and 
important (+10%) in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden. Most 
of these deductions are earnings-related or are social insurance contributions. Only in 
Germany, deductions are mainly related to old age and pensions, whereas in the 
Netherlands the mortgage interest deductions have most weight. Exemptions are 
important in Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and UK. In France and Italy 
exemptions are mainly related to capital income. In the other countries exemptions 
consist mainly of social benefits. Credits have some weight in Belgium (chiefly the 
basic tax credit in the field of family policy), but are very small in other countries. 
 
Table 11: Average rate of the tax components as a proportion of gross income, EU-15, 1998. 
  Exemptions (e)  Deductions (d)  Allowances (a)  Taxable income (y)  Credits (k) 
Austria 0.0619  0.2293  0.0003  0.7085  0.0429 
Belgium 0.0745  0.1880  -  0.7375  0.0803 
Denmark 0.0413 0.1337  -  0.8250  - 
Finland 0.1285  0.0796  -  0.7919  0.0054 
France 0.1381  0.3262 -  0.5357  0.0201 
Germany 0.0382 0.2313 0.0074  0.7231  - 
Greece -0.0016  0.1386  - 0.8630  0.0083 
Ireland 0.1034  0.0182  0.2452  0.6332  0.0043 
Italy 0.1612  0.0756  -  0.7632  0.0401 
Luxembourg 0.0559  0.2227  -  0.7214  0.0083 
Netherlands -0.0098  0.1330  0.2091  0.6677  - 
Portugal 0.0690  0.3402  -  0.5908  0.0186 
Spain 0.0014  0.0836  - 0.9150  0.0217 
Sweden 0.1504  0.1270  -  0.7226  0.0000 
UK 0.1161  0.0147  0.2622  0.6070  0.0114 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
6.2  Progressivity structure of the PIT components: Kakwani indices 
There is again a wide variety among countries when we look at the structure of the tax 
components: some are pro-poor, whereas others are regressive or rather proportional. 
 
In most countries exemptions are pro-poor. Some countries even have a very high 
value of the Kakwani index for exemptions. In Austria, Belgium, Germany and 
Luxembourg exemptions consist mainly of family related benefits, more specifically 
child benefits. The highest Kakwani indices are found in those countries where 
exemptions include mainly benefits for unemployment or minimum income support, 
as is the case in Ireland and the UK. Exemptions are most progressive in Spain, which 
is not surprising as it consists of a means-tested benefit. The more benefits are 
concentrated among the lower income groups, the more pro-poor their exemption of 
taxation is. The negative values of the Kakwani indices of exemptions come from the 
so-called negative exemptions (i.e. the imputed taxable income components). This is 
the case in Greece, the Netherlands and in Italy. The most striking result here is the 
  23score of –1.80 for the Netherlands. This means that imputed rent is situated relatively 
more at the lower end of the income distribution and that adding its value to taxable 
income has a negative effect on progressivity. 
 
Table 12: Kakwani indices of PIT components (Exemptions E, Deductions D, Allowances A, 
Rate schedule R, Credits K, Personal Income Taxes T), EU-15, 1998. 
  K
E Π  
K
D Π  
K
A Π  
K
R Π  
K
K Π  
K
pit
T Π  
Austria  0.4417 0.0034 0.3088 0.1088 0.3630 0.2961 
Belgium 0.3019  -0.0002  - 0.0665  0.2847  0.2797 
Denmark 0.5751  -0.0619 - 0.1644 - 0.1831 
Finland  0.0587  0.0381 - 0.2497  -0.0307  0.2784 
France  0.1590 -0.0276  -  0.3389 -0.2258 0.4401 
Germany  0.5478 0.2681 0.1252 0.1703  -  0.2842 
Greece  -0.2456  0.0977 - 0.2437 0.1778 0.2928 
Ireland  0.5992 -0.2485 0.2281 0.1096 -0.1861 0.2917 
Italy -0.0586  -0.0235  -  0.0709  0.3404  0.1562 
Luxembourg  0.4138  0.1392 - 0.2728  0.3062  0.3907 
Netherlands  -1.8009  -0.0745  0.2620  0.2330 - 0.3268 
Portugal 0.2204  0.2174 - 0.0905  0.2312  0.3250 
Spain  1.1462  0.0717 - 0.2078  0.0808  0.2622 
Sweden  0.0991  0.1864 - 0.4240  -0.2783  0.4774 
UK  0.6876 -0.2378 0.1700 0.0343 0.0704 0.2594 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
Deductions are pro-poor in Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. In 
Germany, deductions are aimed at pensioners, who situated relatively more in the 
lower part of the distribution. In the other three countries, deductions are mainly 
earnings related or social insurance contributions. Deductions are pro-rich in Ireland 
and UK. In both countries these are (private) pension contributions, which are clearly 
concentrated at the upper end of the distribution. 
 
Allowances are pro-poor in all countries where they are used 
 
The rate schedule is everywhere progressive. Here we have some interesting results. 
One might assume that a large number of tax bands would lead to a more progressive 
tax system: the more tax bands, the more the tax rate increases with income. But 
apparently there is no relationship between the number of tax bands and rate 
progressivity: countries with the largest number of tax bands are not necessarily the 
most progressive in their rate structure, and vice versa (cf. table 4; e.g. Spain, which 
has 9 tax bands and an average value for rate progressivity, whereas Sweden has only 
2 tax bands but the highest value of  ). Something similar applies for the upper 
tariff: Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands have the highest top rates, but their  are 
not that high compared to other countries. Here the role of pre-tax income inequality, 
the composition of taxable income and the role of joint or individual taxation become 
apparent. This also shows how important the characteristics of underlying income 
distribution are. The rate schedule is most progressive in France and Sweden; in 






Credits are pro-poor in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
These credits are mainly family policy related and lump sum; in Luxembourg the 
effect follows from the tax adjustment for low incomes. Credits are pro-rich in France, 
  24Ireland and Sweden. In Sweden the tax credit is granted for capital income and in 
Ireland mainly for mortgage interest relief. 
 
6.3  Contribution to progressivity of the PIT components 
The structure and weight of the different PIT components are brought together in table 
13, where we express the contribution of each component as a percentage of total PIT 
progressivity.  What strikes immediately is that the rate structure is the most important 
factor in most countries. Furthermore, there is a strong effect from exemptions and 
allowances in Ireland and the UK, from deductions in Germany and Portugal and 
from credits in Austria, Belgium and Italy, as well as in France but then in a negative 
way. In 10 of the 15 countries the rate schedule accounts for the majority of total 
progressivity. In Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Spain and Sweden more than 
85% of progressivity comes from the rate structure. These are in general the countries 
with the highest  . In Luxembourg, which also has a high  , the rate schedule 
accounts for 74%. In the Netherlands, Germany and Italy the rate structure is the most 
important determinant, but also other components have a considerable effect 
(allowances in the Netherlands, deductions in Germany and credits in Italy). In 3 
countries progressivity results mainly from the composition of the tax base (i.e. the 
joint effect of exemptions, deductions and allowances): this is the case for Ireland, the 
UK and Portugal. In Belgium and Austria, we find a mixture of the rate structure, 






We can thus distinguish three groups of countries: 
1)  rate structure countries: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden; 
2)  tax base composition countries: Ireland, Portugal and UK; 
3)  mixed structure countries: Austria and Belgium. 
 
We can compare this with the typology in Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001), though 
we have to be careful: the databases are not the same, and the income concept is also 
quite different. In Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, taxable income is used and not gross 
income; exemptions E are not taken into account (as the data were not available in the 
administrative OECD dataset). Their analysis refers to the mid-late 1980s and most 
countries have embarked on rather substantial tax reforms towards the end of the 
eighties. However, bearing these caveats in mind, we try to draw some conclusions 
about the evolution of the PIT systems. A first conclusion is that most countries are 
still in the same group. According to Loizides (1988) in Greece the rate structure was 
the main determinant of progressivity, and this turns out to be still the case. A second 
observation is that Finland, Germany and Sweden have shifted from the mixed 
structure group to the rate structure category. For Finland and Sweden we have to 
qualify this observation: in our calculations local taxes are a separate category, and 
thus not included in the analysis of personal income taxes, whereas they are included 
in Wagstaff and van Doorslaer. A last observation is that the tax reform in Denmark 
has also leaded this country into the rate structure group. We cannot say anything 
about the evolution of Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal, as they were not in the 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer study. As a broad pattern we see that the rate structure 
was already the major source for progressivity in the mid eighties, and apparently this 
pattern has been reinforced in the countries of the EU-15 in the mid-late 1990s. 
  25Table 13: Contribution of the various PIT components to PIT progressivity (between brackets: contribution as a % of PIT progressivity) in the EU-15, 1998. 
    K Exemptions   Deductions  Allowances  Rate schedule  Credits (K) 
T Π  
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  267 Conclusions 
 
Summarising, the following observations and conclusions can be drawn on the basis 
of our EUROMOD-research on the redistributive effect of taxes in the EU-15. 
1.  As expected, there is a wide variation in the EU-15 in the redistributive efforts 
through taxes on household income. France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden have 
a low degree of inequality reduction through taxes (about 10% of pre-tax income 
inequality), whereas Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany and 
Luxembourg have a redistributive effect that is relatively high (around 20% of 
pre-tax inequality). 
2.  Countries with a high degree of pre-tax income inequality do not redistribute 
systematically more through their taxes. The results suggest rather the opposite: 
countries with a high pre-tax inequality level tend to redistribute rather less. We 
deduce this from the finding that the correlation between inequality before taxes 
and the average tax rate is negative and significantly different from zero. This 
supports the supposition that an initially unequal distribution and the social choice 
to redistribute rather little is probably based on the same underlying factors, such 
as a strong emphasis on individual responsibility and a big confidence in the 
market. 
3.  A mixture of personal income taxes (PIT), social insurance contributions (SIC) 
and other taxes is used to achieve tax progressivity. However, PIT are the most 
important source of progressivity and hence income inequality reduction. The only 
exceptions are Denmark and Sweden, where progressivity arises from a mixture of 
the three tax types, with a preponderance of local taxes. 
4.  All PIT systems exhibit a progressive structure. This broadly applies also for SIC 
and other taxes, but there are some exceptions. SIC are regressive in Greece, the 
Netherlands and Spain, whereas other taxes are pro-rich in Belgium and the UK. 
5.  There is a trade-off between progressivity and the average tax rate, and this is true 
for total taxes as well as for personal income taxes. Apparently, a government puts 
more burden on the broadest shoulders, if the tax weight is rather mild. But when 
the tax level is high, it appears to be more difficult to avoid that everybody pays 
its share of taxes, such that the tax rate increase less with income level. 
6.  If we concentrate on PIT progressivity, we find that broadly all tax exemptions 
and tax allowances enhance progressivity. The only exception is Italy, where 
exemptions are pro-rich. The evidence on tax deductions and tax credits is mixed: 
tax deductions have a noticeable inequality reducing effect in Denmark and 
France and an inequality enhancing impact in Germany, Greece, Portugal and 
Sweden. Tax credits have a considerable pro-poor impact in Austria, Belgium, 
Italy and the Netherlands, and are pro-rich in France. 
7.  The rate structure always contributes positively to the progressivity of the PIT 
system, so there is a wide variety among countries in the importance of this 
instrument. For some countries (e.g. France and Spain) it is almost the sole source 
of progressivity, whereas in other countries its relative contribution to overall 
progressivity amounts only to 14% or 33% (resp. the UK and Portugal). 
8.  As was shown in previous research, the rate structure was in general already the 
major source for progressivity in the mid eighties. Apparently, this pattern has 
been reinforced in the EU-15 in the mid-late 1990s. 
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  29Appendix 1: EUROMOD datasets 
 




Austria  Austrian version of European 
Community Household Panel (W5) 
1999 annual  1998 
Belgium  Panel Survey on Belgian Households 
(W6) 
1999 annual  1998 
Denmark  European Community Household 
Panel (W2)  
1995 annual  1994 
Finland  Income distribution survey   1998  annual 1998 
France  Budget de Famille  1994/5  annual 1993/4 
Germany  German Socio-Economic Panel (W15) 1998  annual 1997 
Greece  European Community Household 
Panel (W2) 
1995 annual  1995 
Ireland  Living in Ireland Survey (W1)  1994  month in 1994 
Italy  Survey of Households Income and 
Wealth  
1996 annual  1995 
Luxembourg  PSELL-2 (W5)  1999  annual 1998 
Netherlands Sociaal-economisch  panelonderzoek 
(W3) 
1996 annual  1995 
Portugal  European Community Household 
Panel (W3) 
1996 annual  1995 
Spain  European Community Household 
Panel (W3) 
1996 annual  1995 
Sweden  Income distribution survey   1997  annual 1997 
UK  Family Expenditure Survey   1995/6  month in 1995/6 
Source: Sutherland, 2001 
  30APPENDIX 2: Measuring the redistributive effect of taxes 
 
A.1 Lorenz and concentration curves 
 
The indices used in this paper for measuring the effect of taxes are based on the Lorenz curve. 
Income units are ranked in ascending order of their pre-tax income x. Plotting the cumulative 
proportion of pre-tax income received against the cumulative proportion of income units 
yields the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income (figure A.1). The redistributive effect of taxes, i.e. 
the reduction of inequality following from taxation, can be represented by the shift of the pre-
tax to the post-tax income Lorenz-curve. In order to draw the post-tax income Lorenz-curve 
income units are ranked in ascending order of their post-tax income x-t(x) (with t(x) 
representing taxes). Plotting the cumulative proportion of post-tax income received against 
the cumulative proportion of income units yields the Lorenz curve of post-tax income. If the 
post-tax Lorenz curve lies closer to the 45° line than the pre-tax curve (as is the case in figure 
A.1), then inequality is reduced because of taxes. Plotting the post-tax income shares against 
the cumulative proportion of income units ordered according to their pre-tax income, yields 
the concentration curve for post-tax income. The post-tax income Lorenz and concentration 
curves differ from each other in the way income units are ranked. Both curves coincide when 
income units do not change ranks because of taxes. But when the ranking of income units is 
changed by the tax system, then both curves are distinct. Reranking of income units occurs in 
real-world income taxes, e.g. because of differential treatment. 
 
Figure  A.1: Lorenz curves for pre-tax (Pre LC) and post-tax (Post LC) income and 























































Tax liability of an income unit with pre-tax income x is represented by t(x). The average tax 
rate t is the proportion of tax in pre-tax income, or t = t(x)/x. A tax system is called 
progressive when the proportion of income taken in tax increases with income (Kakwani 
(1984). This means that the average tax rate should increase with income and that the tax 
system is ‘pro-poor’ (Blackorby & Donaldson (1984); Lambert (1985)). The tax system is 
said to be proportional when the average tax rate is constant, and regressive when t decreases 
with rising income. The concentration curve for taxes plots the tax shares against the 
  31cumulative proportion of income units ordered according to their pre-tax income. When the 
income tax is progressive, we see an inward shift from the pre- to the post-tax Lorenz curve. 
This shift measures the amount of redistribution following from the income tax compared to a 
distributionally neutral equal-yield taxation. Hence, it measures the redistributive effect of a 
progressive as against a proportional tax raising the same revenue (therefore also known as 
the equal-yield flat-tax) (Lambert, 2001). Thus, if we want to measure the redistributive effect 
of taxation, we compare the pre- and post-tax Lorenz curve; if we are interested in 
progressivity, we look at the tax concentration curve in relation to the pre-tax Lorenz curve.  
 
A.2 Measurement of the effects of taxation 
 
We focus in this paragraph on the most widely used indices for the measurement of the effect 
of taxation. These indices reveal on the one hand the progressivity characteristics of a tax 
system and on the other hand its redistributive effects
11. 
 
Progressivity as departure from proportionality 
 
A very popular index of progressivity is the one proposed by Kakwani (1977a) which 
measures the departure from proportionality as the difference between the concentration 
coefficient of taxes and the Gini of pre-tax income: 
(1)    X T
K
T G C − = Π
The Gini index GX can be derived from the area between the Lorenz curve LX and the 45° line 
of perfect equality; analogously, this can be done for the concentration curve of taxes, thus 
producing a concentration coefficient CT. For large samples the minimum value of the 
Kakwani index is - (1 + GX) (i.e. when the poorest person pays all the tax, CT = -1), while its 




The redistributive effect looks at the shift from pre-tax to post-tax income. When there is no 
reranking, the post-tax Lorenz curve equals the post-tax income concentration curve. For 
measuring the redistributive effect we use the Reynolds-Smolensky (1977) index, which 
equals the difference between the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income and the concentration 
coefficient of post-tax income: 
(A.1)    T X X
RS C G − − = Π
There is a close link between the measures of progressivity and those of redistributive effect 
(Kakwani, 1977a). The redistributive effect appears to be a function of progressivity and of 












Up until now we have assumed that the tax system does not produce changes in the rank order 
of the income units, i.e. that it makes no difference whether income units are ranked in 
ascending order of their pre-tax or their post-tax income. But due to differences in tax 
treatment of income units it is possible that some of them swap positions in the income 
ranking (see also Lambert 1993, 1994a and 1994b). This is captured by the difference 
between the concentration curve and the Lorenz curve of the post-tax income distribution N. 
Consequently, reranking can be measured as the difference between the corresponding 
concentration coefficient, CN, and the Gini coefficient, GN (Atkinson (1980), Plotnick (1981)). 
The Reynolds-Smolensky index is then an indicator of vertical equity VE, i.e. it measures the 
total reduction of inequality that would occur if there were no reranking of income units. The 
                                                 
11 Other measures for progressivity and redistributive effect have been proposed in the literature. For 
information on measures based on e.g. distances and relative concentration curves, see Lambert (2001). 
  32index D =GN -CN measures how much of this equalising effect is ‘undone’ by reranking. 
Thus, the total redistributive effect is the result of a vertical equity and a reranking effect: 
(A.3)  RE =GX - GN = (GX - CN) - (GN - CN) = VE - RR = Π
RS – D 
 
A.3 Decomposition of Progressivity of Taxes 
 
Decomposition of Progressivity of Total Taxes 
 
In most countries there are different types of taxes. Progressivity of total taxes results from 
the progressivity characteristics of these individual taxes. To measure the contribution of each 
type, we decompose the Kakwani index of total taxes. Kakwani (1977a) showed that the 
concentration coefficient of the total tax function T(x) can be written as the sum of the 














where CTi is the concentration coefficient of the ith tax, and ti the average tax rate (i.e. Ti/X). 
Using this relationship the Kakwani index of total taxes can be written as: 



























Decomposition of Progressivity of Personal Income Taxes 
 
The personal income tax schedule Tpit is shorthand for a complex, real world income tax 
schedule. This summary representation obscures the effect of the different components of the 
tax system separately, such as the rate structure and various tax advantages (see figure 1). The 
effect of these different components can be measured by using decomposition formulae that 
make clear how the rate structure and these tax advantages contribute to overall progressivity 
and redistribution. We use the analytical framework presented in Pfähler (1990) and Loizides 
(1988). Other decompositions are possible, but this one has the advantage that it follows the 
logic of the tax system. 
 
Final tax liability is determined by different factors: the tax base (or pre-tax income), tax 
exempt (categories of) income, tax deductions and tax allowances that can be applied on pre-
tax income, the rate schedule and tax credits. The tax base includes all income components 
before tax, and thus determines to a great extent tax liabilities. Taxable income must be 
distinguished from pre-tax income. Some categories of income are part of pre-tax income, but 
are not included in the concept of taxable income; I call this total tax exempt income E (e.g. 
child benefits in most countries). A further distinction between pre-tax and taxable income 
arises from the existence of tax allowances and deductions. Tax allowances A are a fixed 
amount subtracted from pre-tax income. Tax deductions D(X) also reduce taxable income. 
Contrary to tax allowances, they are not a fixed amount but their level is a function of pre-tax 
income. The transition from pre-tax income X to taxable income Y can thus be represented as:  
  Y = X - E - A - D(X) 
The rate schedule r(.) is then applied to taxable income, thus leading us to gross tax liability 
Tg = r(Y). Finally, we find net (or final) tax liability T by reducing gross tax liability Tg with 
total tax credits K: Tpit = Tg – K.   
Net (or disposable) income is then N =X -[ r(X - E - A - D(X)) - K] = X – Tpit 
 
Progressivity of net tax liabilities (or shortly ‘net progressivity’) results from the effect of 
gross tax liabilities minus that of tax credits. Using formula (A.5), we find that the 
concentration coefficient of net tax liabilities, CT, is the weighted average of the different 
concentration coefficients of gross tax liabilities Tg and total tax credits K. The average tax 
  33rate is  , where T k t t G − = g is the average rate of gross tax liabilities (Tg/X) and k is the 
average rate of tax credits (k = K/X). Thus, we find:  








C g − =  
Starting from formula (A.1) we arrive at the following decomposition of the Kakwani index 
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Tg Π is the Kakwani index of gross tax liabilities, measured as the area between the 
concentration curve of gross tax liabilities and the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income.  shows 
the degree of disproportionality of tax credits K relative to the distribution of pre-tax income, 
or  . A positive Kakwani index of tax credits indicates that the tax credit goes 





K C G − = Π
 
Progressivity of gross tax liabilities (or ‘gross progressivity’) results on the one hand from the 
effect of the tax rate structure, which I call ‘direct progressivity’, and on the other hand from 
the effect of the tax base structure, which is ‘indirect progressivity’: 
(A.7)    () () X Y Y Tg
K
T G C C C g − + − = Π
The first term of this formula measures direct progressivity, which follows from the 
progressive tax rate schedule applied on taxable income, and is measured by the difference 
between the concentration curves of gross tax liabilities and taxable income. We call this the 
pure rate effect, which is represented by the index: 
(A.8)    Y Tg
K
R C C − = Π
The second term looks at indirect progressivity, which is caused by taxable income falling 
short of pre-tax income and is measured by CY - GX. Gross tax liability Tg = r(Y) is calculated 
on taxable income Y = X - E - A - D(X), i.e. income after subtraction of exempt income E, tax 
allowances A and tax deductions D(X). Analogously with (A.6) we can write: 
(A.9)  () D A E X X Y C G
d a e
d a e






Using (A.5) in this formula we can write the measure of indirect progressivity as the weighted 
sum of the disproportionality of exemptions, allowances and deductions: 
(A.10) 
( ) ( ) ( ) []
K
D d a e
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A d a e
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with   h  e  as the average rate of exempt income and   measuring the   
disproportionality of exempt income; 
E X
K
E C G − = Π
a as the average rate of allowances and   measuring the 
disproportionality of allowances; 
A X
K
A C G − = Π • 
•  d  as the average rate of deductions, and  , measuring the 
disproportionality of deductions. 
D X
K
D C G − = Π
Just as with tax credits, a positive value of  ,   and  corresponds with exemptions, 
allowances and deductions benefiting relatively more to lower incomes, and thus enhancing 








  34 APPENDIX 3: Definition of income concepts for each country 
 
For each country we have defined the following income concepts: 
-  gross or pre-tax income (X), which includes all gross cash benefit payments, 
gross income from work (salaries, wages, self-employment income), property 
income, other cash market income and occupational pension income 
-  total taxes (T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth) 
-  (net) personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
-  other direct taxes (Toth) 
-  social insurance contributions (Tsic) 
-  net or disposable income (N = X - T), which corresponds to the EUROMOD 
standard definition of Household Disposable Income (HDI) (see e.g. Sutherland, 
2001) 
-  exemptions (E), which also include imputed taxable income components (see 
section 2.2.1) 
-  allowances (A) 
-  deductions (D) 
-  taxable income (Y), which corresponds to X – E – A – D  
-  gross tax liability (Tg) 
-  credits (K) 
 
For the various income concepts we list in this appendix the income components that 
are included. Income components in italic have a value zero. For each country we also 
present a table which summarises the average values of the income concepts. In 
general, the income concepts are listed in the columns, whereas the variables are 
written in the rows. In the first column you find the variable name as it is programmed 
in EUROMOD. The next 5 or 6 columns indicate which variables are included in the 
resp. income concepts: e.g. if the variable has a value 1 in the second column, it 
means that it is entirely part of gross income X; if it has a weight 0.2, only 20% is part 
of the income concept. The last two columns give the average values of the variables. 
In the last but one column we find the average household amount (“mean”), whereas 
the last column presents the average equivalised household amount weighted for the 
number of individuals in the household (“mean equiv.”) (cf. section 2.3). In principle, 
the sum of the corresponding weighted variables should give the average total amount 
of the income concept (“sum” and “sum equiv.”) This will however not always be the 
case for allowances (A), deductions (D) and taxable income (Y). It is sometimes 
possible that the value of A and/or D exceeds Y. We have corrected in such a way that 
Y is nowhere below zero, and that A and/or D are reduced such that X = Y – E – A – 
D.  
  35AUSTRIA 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
   Tsic =  self-employed contributions to disability insurance + employee health insurance contributions 
+ self-employed health insurance contributions + employee contributions to pensions 
insurance + self-employed contributions to pensions insurance + employee contributions to 
unemployment insurance + employee contributions to housing subsidy + employee 
compulsory union contributions 
   Toth =  withholding tax on capital income + churchtax + other personal taxes and contributions  + 
wealth or national property tax  + sub-national (local or regional) taxes  
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E) 
-  maternity payment; maternity allowance supplement; pregnancy benefit; child benefits; child birth 
benefit; addition to child benefit for disabled children; provincial family bonus; small children 
benefit; child care benefit; caring benefit 
-  study allowances 
-  social assistance 
-  37.5% of private pension benefit payments 
-  unemployment benefits; unemployment payments 
-  housing benefits (housing benefits) 
-  investment income (taxed as part of ‘other taxes’, i.e. withholding tax on capital income) 
-  maintenance payments; private transfers received 
 
Allowances (A) 
-  for disability 
-  for self-assessment income 
-  for agricultural workers (at_it_agriworker_tfa) 
 
Deductions (D) 
-  for single earners 
-  cost of earnings; part of ‘other earnings’;  limited expenditures 
-  SIC (self-employed contributions to disability insurance; self-employed health insurance 
contributions; self-employed contributions to pensions insurance; employee SIC) 
-  Church tax 
-  Charitable donations 
-  Exceptional costs 
 
Taxable income (Y) 
Y = X – E – A – D   (correction of Y, D, A for negative values of Y) 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
= application of rate schedule before tax credits 
 
Credits (K) 
-  general; child tax credit; lone parents; Single earners 
-  pensioners  
-  Commuters; income tax reduction; wage earners; progression adjustment 
-  Preferential tax of other earnings is a negative tax credit (as it increases taxes) 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
 = national income tax (is sometimes negative. Some tax credits are refundable in Austria) 
 
  36BELGIUM 
 
Gross Income (X) 
Remark: investment income is part of gross and net income, but not always of taxable income, (only 
when it is  beneficial for the taxpayer) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
Tsic = employee contributions to healthcare and sickness insurance + employee contributions to 
unemployment insurance + employee contributions to pension insurance + self-employed social 
insurance contributions + health insurance and solidarity contributions paid by pensioners 
Toth = sub-national (local or regional) taxes + other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or 
national property tax 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  child benefit; birth/adoption allocation  
-  study allowances 
-  minimum income (minimex) 
-  minimum income for old persons 
-  allocation for handicapped persons 
-  20% of maintenance payments received  
-  other (housing benefits; irregular lump sum benefits; other regular primary income; other private 
transfers received; other regular cash payments) 
Remark: 1) imputed rent is imputed taxable income  






-  SIC 
-  cost of earning income deduction  
-  Real Estate Deductions:  mortgage interest + dwelling allowance + additional dwelling allowance 
-  Deductible Expenses: maintenance payments (80%) 
-  marital quotient: the part that is deducted from one spouse is a negative figure and thus becomes a 
positive deduction, where as the part that is added to the income of the other spouse is positive and 
increases taxable income (and thus a negative deduction)  
 
Taxable income (Y)  
Y = X – E – A – D    
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
application of rate schedule on taxable income of both spouses 
 
Credits (K)  
-  basic exemption (single/spouse) + family tax credit 
-  replacement income credit 
-  zero tax for some low replacement incomes; 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 




  37DENMARK 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
  Tsic = own contribution to supplementary pension scheme + general own social contribution + 
temporary own pension contribution + voluntary unemployment insurance contribution 
  Toth = other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or national property tax + local income tax 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E) 
-  child benefits (incl. ‘ordinary’, extra’, ‘special’ and ‘multichildren’ benefit); family allowance; day 
care subsidy 
-  study allowances  
-  housing benefits  
-  part of disability pension (invalidity amount plus augmentation plus special benefit for disabled 
with substantial earnings) 
-  other private transfers received 






-  alimony received for children 
-  maintenance payments 
-  Social insurance contributions (=Tsic )  
-  pension contributions 
-  mortgage interest 
Remark: the other two ‘deductions’ (transfer deduction & capital transfer deduction) are not considered 
as deductions, but as part of the tax rate structure. They can be seen as building stones of a progressive 
rate structure (see also ‘Gross tax liability’). 
 
Taxable income (Y) Y = X – E – A – D 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
= bottom national income tax + middle national income tax + top national income tax  
the rate structure can be seen as consisting of 4 tax bands: 
Tax bands in DK/year  Tax rate  % 
0 – 31400  0%   
31 400 – 139 000  8%  = 8 
139 000 – 251 200  14%  = 8 + 6 
251 200 +  29%  = 8 + 6 + 15 
The income concept for each % is not entirely the same (the 6%-income-concept has 2 extra deductions 
compared to the 8%-income-concept (i.e. maintenance payments & voluntary unemployment insurance 
contribution), whereas the 15%-income-concept differs from the 6%-income-concept in the sense that 
it does not include investment income.  
The boundaries of the tax bands can differ for tax units for two reasons (see country report): 
1)  the upper limit of the first band can be 22500 Dk for children 
2)  unused parts of taxfree amounts can be transferred between spouses 
 
Credits (K)  
none 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= bottom national income tax + middle national income tax + top national income tax  
  38FINLAND 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
 Tsic = employee social contributions + employee sickness contributions + self-employed contributions 
to pensions insurance 
 Toth =coOTHTAX + wealth or national property tax + local non-capital income taxation + church non-
capital income taxation  + capital taxation + real estate taxation  + deposit interest income tax 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  child benefit; lone parent child benefit; child day care benefit, child home care non-means-tested 
payment; child home care additional means-tested benefit; ex-child home care subsidy 
-  social assistance benefits 
-  military injury compensation 
-  housing benefit; pensioners housing benefit; student housing benefit  
-  part of investment income 
-  property income 
-  maintenance payments received 
-  part of self-employment income  
-  pension from abroad 
-  other (other regular primary income; irregular lump sum benefits; other private transfers received; 
other regular cash payments) 
 
Allowances (A)  
none 
 
Deductions (D)  
-  deduction for pension income  
-  natural deductions (priority) = deduction for professional expenses  (= standard deduction for 
employees + deduction for sailors, for travel expenses etc.) 
-  part of employee social contributions (= employee social contributions for occupational pensions + 
employee social contributions for unemployment) 
-  state tax deductions for sailors  
-  for income losses 
-  Other deductions (fisotded) 
 
Taxable income (Y)  
Y = X – E – A – D 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
application of rate schedule on taxable income of both spouses 
 
Credits (K)  
-  child maintenance tax credit 
-  disability tax credit  
-  fi_it_temp_house (everywhere zero) 
-  Deficit capital compensation tax credit 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national income tax 
 
  39 
FRANCE 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
  Tsic = all employee social insurance contributions 
  Toth = sub-national (local or regional) taxes + other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or 
national property tax + capital income tax  
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  family benefits (allocation familial; family benefit for young children; fr_sben_ars; alloc. de rentrée 
scolaire; family benefit for many children; social benefit for special education; social benefit for 
parental education; support for child care; lone parent benefit; social benefit for lone parents) 
-  minimum income; minimum pension; social aid 
-  social benefit for dependent elderly 
-  allowance for handicapped persons (means tested); invalidity pension; war pension 
-  investment income 
-  maintenance payments received 
-  property income 
-  other (irregular lump sum benefits; other regular primary income; other private transfers received) 
 




-  personal deduction 
-  for pensions 
-  for professional expenses  
-  part of SIC: general employee social insurance contributions; css contribution on unemployment 
and on pensions; special contribution on unemployment income for pensions; contribution on 
pension income for sickness;  
-  part of csg-contributions on employment income, on unemployment income, on pensions and on 
other income 
 
Taxable income (Y) 
Y = X – E – A – D  (correction Y, D and A, if Y<0) 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
Includes both application of the rate schedule as the advantage of the Family Quotient. 
 
Credits (K)  
-  Tax rebate (décoté); 
-  Tax credit (imputed):,  
-  Tax credit for those who pay less than 400 FF (tax is reduced to zero) 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
 = national income tax 
 
  40GERMANY 
 
Gross Income (X)  
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
 Tsic =employee health social insurance contributions + employee social insurance contributions for 
disability + employee contributions to pensions insurance + employee contributions to unemployment 
insurance 
 Toth = sub-national (local or regional) taxes + other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or 
national property tax + solidarity surplus tax 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E) 
-  child benefit; federal child raising benefit; provincial child raising benefit; post natal benefit for 
non-earning mothers;  
-  study allowances 
-  social assistance 
-  nursing home insurance premia received 
-  unemployment allowances 
-  housing benefits; direct housing support 
-  Other (other regular primary income; irregular lump sum benefits; other regular cash payments) 
 
Allowances (A) 
-  child tax allowance (compared with child benefit via optimization) 
-  lone Parent tax allowance 
 
Deductions (D)  
-  Deduction on Civil Servant Pensions; for old age;  non-earnings part of non-civil-servant pensions; 
-  Part of old age and Widow/Orphan pensions 
-  Expenditure Deductions (which includes also deduction of part of social insurance contributions) 
-  Old Age Deductions 
-  Part of maintenance payments 
-  Deduction for earned wages 
-  Deduction from investment income 
 
Taxable income (Y) 
Y = X – E – A – D 
 





Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
national income tax 
 
  41GREECE 
 
 
Gross Income (X)  
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
 Tsic = civil servants social contribution + ika employee contributions + farmer’s sic + ika pensioner 
contributions + self-employed contributions 
 Toth = other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or national property tax + sub-national (local 
or regional) taxes  
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  Housing benefits  
-  Study allowances 
-  other private transfers received 
remark: lump sum income is imputed taxable income 
 
Allowances (A)  
none 
 
Deductions (D)  
-  Social Insurance contributions (Tsic) 
-  Mortgage interest payments 
-  Medical expenses deduction 
-  Private education expenditure deduction 
-  Rent deduction 
 
Taxable income (Y)  
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
= taxes after application of the rate schedule 
 
Credits (K)  
-  Household expenditure 
-  Private pension contributions 
-  Children 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national income tax 
 
  42IRELAND 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
  Tsic = general employee social insurance contributions 
  Toth = other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or national property tax + sub-national (local 
or regional) taxes 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  Housing benefits  
-  Study allowances 
-  Maintenance payments received 
-  Carer’s non-contributory benefits 
-  Child benefits 
-  Short Term Disabled Contributory Benefits 
-  Family Income Supplement 
-  Long Term Invalidity Contributory Benefits 
-  Unemployed (Non-)contributory Benefits 
-  Maternity Contributory Benefits 
-  Orphan’s Contributory Benefits 
-  Social Minimum non-contributory benefits 
-  Unemployment supplement 
-  other (irregular lump sum benefits; other regular cash payments, deserted wives’ non-contributory 
benefits) 
 
Allowances (A)  
-  Age  
-  Lone parent  
-  Single/married  
-  Widowed 
-  Employee 
 
Deductions (D)  
-  Pension contributions 
-  Imputed Self-Employment Deduction 
 
Taxable income (Y)  
Y = X – E – A – D  
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
 
Credits (K)  
-  mortgage interest relief 
-  permanent health insurance relief  
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national income tax 
 
 
  43ITALY 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
  Tsic = general employee social insurance contributions = employee contribution + executive additional 
contribution + self-employment contribution 
  Toth = sub-national (local or regional) taxes + other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or 
national property tax + deposit tax + tax on government bonds + tax on other bonds + tax on dividends 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E) 
-  Housing benefits 
-  Maintenance payments received  
-  Maternity payments  
-  15% of property income 
-  Family allowances (1 adult +  no children; 1 adult + children; 2 adults +  no children; 2 adults + children) 
-  Social security benefits from national administrations; from regional administrations; from 
provincial administrations; from municipal administrations; from local health centre; from other 
local P.A.; from other private institutions.  
-  Social pension and War pension  
-  State disability non contributory pension; INAIL Disability non-contributory pension  
-  Other (irregular lump sum benefits; other regular cash payments; other regular primary income) 
-  Tax evasion (correction for underreporting) 
-  investment income is no part of Y, and thus part of E. It is however taxed separately and the 
corresponding taxes are in Toth 
remark: Imputed cadastral values is imputed taxable income (taxable rental income; land-imputed 
cadastral value; main residence-imputed cadastral value; other buildings -imputed cadastral value) 
 
Allowances (A)  
none 
 
Deductions (D)  
-  General employee social insurance contributions (Tsic) 
-  House deduction 
-  Other expenditures deductible from taxable income (imputed) 
 
Taxable income (Y)  
Y = X – E – A – D 
 




-  Work-related expenses for employees (earnings tax credit) 
-  Work-related expenses for pensioners (earnings tax credit + pension tax credit) 
-  Work-related expenses for self-employed (self-employment earnings tax credit) 
-  Tax credit for dependent spouse 
-  For dependent children 
-  For lone parents 
-  Other dependents 
-  Insurance tax credit + mortgage interest tax credit + other tax credits (imputed) 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national and local income tax (IRPEF) + tax on productive activities of self-employed 
 
  44LUXEMBOURG 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
  Tsic = self-employed contributions to disability insurance + employee health social insurance 
contributions + self-employed health insurance contributions + employee contributions to pensions 
insurance + self-employed contributions to pensions insurance + self-employed (non-farmers) family 
benefits contribution 
  Toth = sub-national (local or regional) taxes + other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or 
national property tax  
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E) 
-  Study allowances, Education allowance, School allowance 
-  Child benefit; handicapped child benefit; orphan allowance 
-  Pre-, postnatal and birth allowances; maternity allowances 
-  Housing benefits 
-  Seriously Disabled Persons; Permanent Accident Benefit 
-  Care benefits 
-  Other benefits from the Fonds national de Solidarité; other Public Benefits 
-  Sickness Replacement Salary/Wage (is part of current employment income in Euromod) 
-  other (irregular lump sum benefits; other private transfers received) 
 
Allowances (A)  
None 
 
Deductions (D)  
-  social insurance contributions (=Tsic)  
-  wage-earners  
-  ‘professional’ couples 
-  agricultural salaried workers 
-  pensioners   
-  disabled; disabled employees  
-  farmers 
-  child care; family care  
-  exemption for accessory income 
-  exemption for LUX investment income + related costs 
-  expenditure deductions 
-  lone parents 
-  property income 
-  low incomes of class 1a. (this deduction appears in EUROMOD for “programming” reasons but it 
is not a deduction that appears in the law.)  
-  Adjustment deduction to round incomes to lower 1000 
 
Taxable income (Y) Y = X – E – A – D 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
 
Credits (K) 
-  Deduction for child care expenditures  
-  Adjustment of taxable income depending on tax "class" (for lower income families) 
-  Unemployment additional insurance tax, is an extra surtax (calculated as 2.5% of taxes) and is thus 
treated as a negative tax credit. 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national income tax 
  45NETHERLANDS 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
 Tsic = self-employed contributions to disability insurance + employee health social insurance 
contributions + employee contributions to pensions insurance + employee contributions to 
unemployment insurance 
  Toth = other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or national property tax + sub-national (local 
or regional) taxes 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  Housing benefits  
-  Study allowances 
-  Maternity payments 
-  Child benefits 
-  Maintenance payments received from ex-spouse for children 
-  other (irregular lump sum benefits; other private transfers received; other regular cash payments) 
remark: Use of car from employer and Imputed income from owner occupied house is imputed taxable 
income  
 
Allowances (A)  
-  Pension deductions 
-  Basic tax free allowance 
-  Investment income tax free allowance 
-  Single parent tax free allowance  
 
Deductions (D)  
-  Deduction for professional expenses 
-  Self employment income deduction 
-  Mortgage interest payment deduction 
-  SIC: self-employed contributions to disability insurance  + employee contributions to 
unemployment insurance – employer contributions for health insurance (employer contributions for 
health insurance are added to Y, and thus a negative deduction as they are no part of X)  
-  Pension contributions 
-  Maintenance payments (to exspouse for or directly to) children 
-  Amounts in special savings accounts or received  from special arrangements 
 
Taxable income (Y) Y = X – E – A – D 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
 
Credits (K)  
none 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national income tax 
  46PORTUGAL 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
 Tsic = employee social insurance contributions + self-employed social insurance contributions 
 Toth = sub-national (local or regional) taxes + other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or 
national property tax + capital income taxes 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  Study allowances 
-  Housing benefit  
-  Investment income  
-  Maintenance payments received 
-  Maternity payments 
-  Property income 
-  Private pension benefit payments 
-  Child benefits  
-  Income supplement to ensure minimum income 
-  Unemployment related benefits  
-  Family benefits 
-  Social assistance  
-  other (irregular lump sum benefits; other regular cash payments: other regular primary income; 
other private transfers received) 
-  treated as a negative exemption: coLUMPY 
remark: Lump sum income is imputed taxable income 
 
Allowances (A)  
None 
 
Deductions (D)  
-  for housing debt  
-  for employment income 
-  for self-employment income 
-  for pension income 
 
Taxable income (Y) 
Y = X – E – A – D  
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
 
Credits (K)  
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
Income Tax 
  47 SPAIN 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
  Tsic  =  Agrarian employment social insurance contribution + Agrarian self employment social 
insurance contribution + Apprenticeship employee social insurance contribution + General 
Employee SICs + part-time employee social insurance contribution + Self-Employed SICs + 
SICs for the unemployed 
 Toth = other personal taxes and contributions + wealth or national property tax + sub-national (local 
or regional) taxes 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E)  
-  Child Social Assistance 






-  Social insurance contributions (=Tsic) 
-  Investment income: part of it is taxable, and another part is not.  
-  Main income tax deduction from employment income  
-  Employment income deduction 
 
Taxable income (Y)  
Y = X – E – A – D 
remark: income from property is part of taxable income, but not included due to lack of data. 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
 
Credits (K) 
-  Income Tax Child Tax Credit (National and Regional) 
-  Income Tax dependent parent Tax Credit 1 (National and Regional) 
-  Income Tax dependent parent Tax Credit 2 (National and Regional) 
-  Income Tax dependent elderly person Tax Credit (National and Regional) 
-  Income Tax rent Tax Credit (National and Regional) 
-  Employment Income Tax Credit 
-  Mortgage tax credit 
Not included because of lack of data: the regional tax credits; Income Tax medical expenses Tax Credit 
(National and Regional); Income Tax child care expenditure Tax Credit (National and Regional); 
Income Tax disabled person Tax Credit (National and Regional) 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national income tax 
 
  48 SWEDEN 
 
Gross income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
  Tsic = general pension fee 
  Toth = sw_it_estate + sw_it_invnet + sw_it_municipal + sw_wealth_taxnet – sw_it_reduction 
remark: self-employment SIC are not included in self-employment income 
 
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E) 
-  Investment income  
-  Maintenance payments received 
-  Child benefits 
-  Housing benefits (housing benefits; Housing benefit supplement for pensioners) 
-  Social assistance 
-  other (irregular lump sum benefits; other regular cash payments: other regular primary income; 
other private transfers received) 
-  Resid. Tax free educational benefits 
-  Residual tax free benefits 
-  University grants; Study grants for high school 
-  Sick benefit self-employed (is maybe part of self-employment income, not clear) 
-  Non-taxable pension 
-  Part of self-employment income. 
 
Allowances (A) IL 
None 
 
Deductions (D) IL 
-  general pension fee (Tsic ) 
-  Pension contributions  
-  Deduction from income tax base 
-  Deduction for new started company 
-  Deduction for periodic maintenance payments 
-  Deduction for travel between home and work'/* over 6000 SEK/year * Business travel 
 
Taxable income (Y)  
Y = X – E – A – D  
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
= national income tax  
 
Credits (K)  
= tax reduction on capital + limitation rule  
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= net national income tax 
 
  49UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Gross Income (X) 
 
Total taxes (T) T = Tpit + Tsic + Toth
 Tsic = Employee social insurance contributions 
 Toth = Council Tax - Council Tax Benefit 
  
Net income (N) N = X - T 
 
Exemptions (E) 
-  Child benefit 
-  Maintenance payments received  
-  Income support  
-  Housing benefits 
-  Family Credit 
-  Study allowances 
-  Disability etc. benefits (disability living allowance (Self Care); DWA; incapacity benefit; industrial 
injury; mobility allowance (now "disability living allowance (Mobility)"); severe disablement 
allowance)  
-  Other (irregular lump sum benefits; other regular cash payments; other private transfers received; 
attendance allowance; training allowance; Non-taxable Investment Income) 
 
Allowances (A) 
-  Personal tax-free allowance 





Taxable income (Y)  
Y = X – E – A – D 
Remark: special rate applied on investment income is included in the rate structure effect 
 
Gross tax liability (Tg) 
 
Credits (K) 
-  Married Couple Income Tax Credit 
-  Age-related Married tax allowance 
-  Mortgage Interest Income Tax Credit 
-  Lone parent tax credit 
 
Net personal income tax liability (Tpit) 
= national income tax 
 
 
 
  50